The September 1985 decision of the G-5 countries to pursue coordinated intervention has been widely credited with the subsequent sharp decline of the dollar relative to other major currencies. On the surface, the dollar's decline appears as evidence that coordinated intervention can be an effective instrument of economic policy, contrary to most of the previous economic analysis of this issue.
New Evidence on the Effects of Exchange Rate Intervention Martin Feldstein* The sharp rise in the value of the dollar that began in 1980 eventually brought widespread calls for active government intervention in foreign exchange markets. American business leaders wanted the dollar reduced because they recognized that the strong dollar was depressing exports and encouraging a major increase In imports to the United States. More surprisingly.
European officials wanted to see a lower dollar because the rising dollar created inflationary pressure in their own countries that was inducing them to pursue an undesirably tight monetary policy,1 while the Japanese government favored a lower dollar to ease the protectionist sentiment developing in the United States.
Most economists, even if they accepted the desirability of lowering the dollar's value, rejected pure exchange market intervention as an ineffective policy instrument. Since the *professor of Economics, Harvard University, and President, The National Bureau of Economic Research. I am grateful to Fiona Scott-Morton for help with the calculations reported in this paper and to Data Resources, Inc. for the use of computing facilities. This research is part of the NEER Research Project on Exchange Rate Misalignment. 1 See Feldstein (1986a) and Feldstein and Bacchetta (1986) for a discussion of the effect of the strong dollar on European monetary and fiscal policy. exchange value of the dollar is determined by the interaction of supply and demand in world security markets, the magnitude of intervention is inevitably too small to have a significant and sustained effect on the dollar exchange rate.2 Although the dollar's value could be reduced by a nonsterilized intervention in which the U.S. government increased the U.S. money supply by the same volume of dollars that it exchanged for foreign currencies, the real reason for the dollar's fall in such a case would be the easing of U.S. monetary policy and not the intervention in foreign exchange markets.
This view was well summarized by Obstfeld (1985, p. 395) when he wrote: "... the overwhelming conclusion of recent research is that in the present international environment, only intervention that is permitted to affect the money supply has a significant impact on the exchange rate." An international group of experts appointed by the International Monetary Fund stated a similar if more guarded conclusion in its 1983 report to the IMF Interim Committee (The Jurgensen Report of the Working Group on Exchange Market Intervention).
But although widely held, this view of the ineffectiveness of sterilized intervention is far from the unanimous judgement of respected international economists. Those who believe that sterilized intervention can be effective emphasize that price setting in exchange rate markets is dominated by changes in 2 The daily volume of foreign exchange trading in London, New York and Tokyo as of March 1986 was officially estimated to be $188 billion. expectations and risk premia rather than by shifts in the current stocks of financial assets. The prospect of government intervention, especially the coordinated intervention of several leading governments, can change the expectations or at least the perceived risks of holding individual currencies. This is particularly true when a government is thought to be committed to reducing rather than defending the value of its own currency since it has an effectively unlimited supply of the currency for that purpose.
Thus Richard Cooper (1985, p. 454) 
explicitly rejected
Obstfeld's conclusion, writing that "The evidence is, in fact, quite ambiguous; the tests are weak; they apply mainly to the influence of asset composition on the exchange risk premium rather than to sterilized intervention as such; and they often assume rational expectations, which may be what the tests are really rejecting. ?? Similarly. Fred Bergsten (1986, p. 233) advocated that "the major central banks should take advantage of just such occasions -when the markets are already pushing currency relationships in the direction of underlying equilibrium through joint intervention to promote the needed degree of adjustment. Such leaning with the wind' would have important brought an abrupt change in U.S. policy and began a period of Although Ronald McKinnon was a forceful advocate of intervention to reduce the dollar's value, he argued for nonsterilized Intervention because he believed that the high value of the dollar reflected an excessively tight monetary policy. See, e.g., McKinnon (1983) . But the case that the G-5 agreement and the subsequent coordinated exchange market intervention have not altered the pace of the evolution of the dollar is much stronger than this appeal to an abundance of other possible explanations of the dollar's rapid decline. The evidence presented in this paper indicates that the decline in the dollar after the G-5 meeting was essentially just a continuation of the decline that had begun I say "in principle" because the experience with econometric models of short-run exchange rate movements has not been very satisfactory. See, for example, the analysis in Meese and Rogoff (1985) . Of course, these models may simply have misspecified the process of exchange rate determination. For evidence of the ability to explain longer-term movements of the dollar in terms of economic fundamentals, see Feldstein (19&5b) and the works cited therein. six months earlier. There has been no significant and sustained acceleration in the pace of the dollar's decline to be attributed to coordinated intervention or to the new attitude of the U.S.
government.
More specifically, the overall trade-weighted value of the dollar dropped by 3.1 percent immediately after the G-5 meeting but then continued to decline at the same average rate of 2.0 percent a month rate for the next nine months that it had experienced since the decline began in March 1985. The statistical evidence for the German mark and the Swiss franc are quite similar. Among the G-5 currencies, only the Japanese yen showed a significantly more rapid decline in the months after the G-5 meeting than it had before; some possible reasons for this difference are discussed below.
Of course, the evidence that the dollar has been declining at the same pace against the trade-weighted basket of other currencies since the G-5 meeting that it was before is not proof that the G-5 rhetoric and subsequent coordinated intervention have not been influential. Defenders of the efficacy of intervention can claim that other factors have offset the acceleration of the dollar's decline that the intervention would otherwise have produced. Or, more simply, they might argue that without intervention the previous decline of the dollar would have slowed or stopped. These possibilities cannot be resolved until a convincing econometric model of exchange rate determination that covers this period has been estimated. But the evidence in this paper eliminates the apparent prima fade case that the shift in exchange rate intervention policy has produced a sharp decline of the dollar. To test whether the dollar declined more rapidly after the G-5 meeting, a second time trend (Time2) is added which takes the value zero until September 1985 and then increases at one unit per month from October 1985 through June 1986: (2) in DOLMTW = 5.105 -0.025 Time + 0.003 TIme2 (0.003) (0.004) j985:3 -1986:6 = 0.98 DWS = 1.9
The point estimate of the coefficient of the TIme2 variable implies that the dollar actually fell more slowly in the period since the G-5 meeting than in the months before. But the coefficient is less than its standard error and therefore cannot be regarded as significantly different from zero.
A more general test of a discontinuity in the trend of the dollar's value is provided by equation 3 that adds a shift term equal to zero through September 1985 and then equal to one thereafter: These estimates of the behavior of the most general multilateral trade weighted measure of the dollar exchange rate provide no support for the view that the dollar declined more rapidly after the G-5 meeting than it did before. Any persistence of the downward shift that occurred immediately after the G-5 meeting is ambiguous and depends on whether the sample is defined to include or exclude the month of the G-5 meeting. The coefficients are presented in a way that is designed to
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give all of the relevant information in the minimum possible amount of space. Instead of presenting standard errors of the coefficients, a system of parentheses and square brackets is used to indicate the statistical significance of the coefficients. A coefficient that is presented without any parentheses or square brackets is more than twice its standard error; this is always true of the basic time trend. A coefficient in parentheses is more than its standard error but less than twice its standard error. Finally, a coefficient in square brackets is less than its standard error and therefore not significantly different from -.159 0.9
A coefficient in parentheses exceeds its standard error but is less than twice Its standard error. A coefficient in square brackets is less than its standard error. Other coefficients are sore than twice their standard error. Constant Moreover, the linear specification for the dollar-franc relation implies that the dollar decline slowed significantly after the G-5 meeting (from 8.1 centimes per month before the G-5 to 5.3 centimes per month after the G-5 meeting).7
When the observation for September 1985 is omitted the estimated linear relation is essentially unchanged while the estimates with the logarithmic specification becomes similar to the linear results; i.e., the second time trend is significantly positive and equal to about one-third of the basic time trend.
The dollar's ratio to the British pound behaved very differently than the dollar's ratio to the other G-5 currencies.
For the period as a whole, the dollar declined relative to the pound at an average rate of only 1.8 percent a month, substantially less than the 2.7 percent rate against the mark and The final currency to be considered is the Japanese yen.0
In contrast to the experience relative to the other G-5
Although the French franc is also one of the G-5 currencies, I have not presented results for the French franc because its behavior so closely parallels that of the German mark to which it is tied through the EMS. currencies, the dollar did decline more rapidly relative to the yen after the G-5 meeting than before. The estimates shown in table 1 indicate that the dollar-yen ratio fell at a rate of 1.5 percent per month before the G-5 meeting, and 3.4 percent after the meeting. In addition, the dollar-yen ratio shifted down by a persistent 6.2 percent at the time of the meeting. The linear specification presents a similar pattern. This picture is unchanged by omitting the observation for September.
It would be wrong, however, to interpret this rise in the yen as evidence of the efficacy of sterilized intervention. At the time of the G-5 meeting the Japanese announced that they would change their domestic monetary policy in order to increase the value of the yen.9 Short-term yen interest rates in Japan were raised sharply to make yen investments more attractive, the 3-month Euroyen rate rising within six weeks of the G-5 meeting from the 6.25 to 6.50 range where it had been for the past two years to more than 8.0 percent by mid-November. The dollar declined by approximately 15 percent against the yen during this six week period, a decline equal to nearly two-thirds of the dollar's accelerated fall against the yen between September and June. The question that remains to be settled by future research is whether nonsterilized intervention during this period raised the yen by any more than would have been expected from the tightening of monetary policy alone.
The Japanese statement promised that Japan would follow a "flexible management of monetary policy with due attention to the yen rate."
Although nominal yen interest rates have declined since late 1985, real interest rates in Japan have been extremely high as Japanese producer prices fell by an unprecedented 10 percent In the 12 months through June 1986. The value of the yen relative to other currencies was also raised during the first half of 1986 by the unexpected and sharp fall in the price of oil. Since the Japanese produce no oil domestically, the fall in the price of oil represented a major unexpected improvement in Japan's future trade balance. The decline in the cost of oil imports required a rise in the yen in order to shrink Japan's non-oil trade surplus to maintain the initial level of the capital outflow.
It will take additional econometric research to see whether the unusually rapid rise in the yen since September 1985 is fully explained by the such fundamental factors as the shift in Japanese monetary policy, the decline in the price of oil, and the surprising strength of the Japanese trade balance. Although the possibility that Intervention per se accelerated the yen's rise cannot be ruled out until that reserach is done, the current evidence can hardly be said to provide a powerful case for the efficacy of sterilized intervention. This Is particularly true since the Japanese were subsequently unsuccessful when they intervened in an attempt to stop the yen's further appreciation when it reached an exchange rate of 180 yen to the dollar.
3.
An Analysis of Weekly xchane Rate Movements
The relatively short period since the dollar began to decline provides only 16 monthly observations on each exchange rate. A shift to weekly observations permits a more than fourfold increase in the number of observations, although the increase in actual information is obviously much less. Table 2 presents The estimates based on weekly data presented in Table 2 .78 2.0
All equations are estiaated with a first-order autoarrelation rrectiori. The autorrelation onefficient of the lagged ridual is shown as Rho.
A onefficient in parentheses emede its standard error bat It l than its standard error. A efficIent in square brats is lees than Its standard error. Other ouefflcient are sore than tidc their standard errors. Constant terne are estiaated but not shown. The R2 of seth equation exceede 0.9. confirm the conclusions based on the monthly estimates presented in Table 1 . With the exception of the relation to the Japanese yen, the evidence indicates that the dollar shifted down by about 5 percent after the G-5 meeting but that there has not been an accelerated rate of decline since then.
Consider, for example, the multilateral trade weighted index. The first entry in the table shows that this declined at a rate of 0.53 percent per week, just in line with the 2.3 percnt per month decline shown in Table 1 . When a second time trend is introduced, the parameter estimates imply a 0.35 percent weekly decline before the G-5 meeting and a 0.50 percent weekly decline after the G-5 meeting. But this is a spurious result, as the next entry in the table indicates. When a shift term is introduced, it is statistically significant while the second time trend becomes positive, very small and less than half of its standard error. The final entry for the multilateral trade weighted index shows that the index declined at 0.43 percent per week over the entire period but with a 5.0 percent downward shift immediately after the G-5 meeting.
The result is essentially the same for the bilateral Morgan Guaranty index, the German mark and the Swiss franc. The results for the British pound are quite erratic, suggesting more of a positive trend and upward shift ih the dollar's relative value than that implied by the monthly data. Only for the yen is there clear evidence of a greater decline in the post-G5 period than before, just as with the monthly data. 22 The linear specifications present a similar picture: a moderate downward shift in the dollar after the G-5 meeting but no evidence of a more rapid decline in the post-G5 period than before except for the yen.
4.

Concluding Comment
The September 1985 decision of the G-5 countries to pursue coordinated intervention has been widely credited with the subsequent sharp decline of the dollar relative to other major currencies. On the surface, the dollar's decline appears as evidence that coordinated intervention can be an effective instrument of economic policy, contrary to most of the previous economic analysis of this issue.
The evidence in the present paper shows that such a conclusion is unwarranted. The dollar's decline in the nine months after the G-5 agreement was generally no faster than it had been since the beginning of its decline in the spring of 1985. The only indication of discontinuity in the overall behavior of the dollar was a drop of about 4 percent that occurred immediately after the G-5 meeting and that has largely persisted.
Although this evidence cannot be taken as a conclusive indication that coordinated intervention had no effect on the exchange rate, it does show the inappropriateness of interpreting the dollar's decline after September 1985 as evidence that coordinated intervention was effective.
The special case of the Japanese yen is more ambiguous.
Unlike all of the other G-5 currencies, the yen did appreciate more rapidly after the G-5 meeting than it did before. But the Japanese government was also unique in making a major shift in monetary policy immediately after the G-5 meeting to strengthen the yen and the yen was also the major currency that could be expected to appreciate most as a result of the massive and unexpected decline of the price of oil in the fir5t half of 1986.
Only careful econometric work can hope to resolve whether the policy of coordinated intervention had an effect on the course of the dollar after the G-5 agreement. The analysis of the present paper shows that until such evidence Is produced, it would be wrong to Infer that intervention as such played any part
In causing the dollar's rapid decline since September 1985.
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